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I. INTRODUCTION
0 N August 18, 1990, George Bush signed into law the Oil Pol-
lution Act of 1990 (OPA). The eleven million gallon oil spill
from the Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound, Alaska in June
1989, followed within months by spills in the coastal waters of
Rhode Island, the Delaware River and the Houston Ship Channel,
prompted Congress to review the issues of oil pollution cleanup,
compensation and liability.' These events demonstrated that "oil
pollution from accidental tanker spills [was] a real and continuing
threat to the public health .... welfare and the environment." 2 It
became apparent that a comprehensive oil pollution liability and
compensation act was necessary to address the concerns raised
about future catastrophic oil spills and the need to prevent
t B.A. 1984, Miami University (Ohio),J.D., cum laude, 1987, South Texas
College of Law, Candidate LL.M. (Energy, Natural Resources and Environmen-
tal Law), 1992, University of Houston. Mr. Donaldson is a sole practitioner
practicing in Houston while completing his LL.M. degree.
1. S. REP. No. 94, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.,
722, 723 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 94].
2. Id.
(283)
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marine pollution and minimize resulting damage.3 These height-
ened concerns about oil spill disasters prompted the House and
the Senate to come together and agree on specific terms for a
comprehensive oil spill liability and compensation statute.
The OPA was a dramatic departure from existing compensa-
tion and liability regimes under both domestic and international
law. It has provided a more comprehensive system of compensa-
tion and response to marine pollution than previously available.
For years, Congress had grappled with possible solutions to the
problems of oil spill cleanup and prevention. Instead of revising
existing law, Congress drafted an extensive and revolutionary
statute which marked a fundamental change to oil spill liability
and compensation. Although it has been almost two years since
the OPA was enacted, its full impact has not yet become apparent.
Interested parties in both the domestic and international commu-
nity continue to react, both positively and negatively, in the wake
of this statute.
This article will describe the development of the OPA's liabil-
ity and compensation framework, the attempts to adopt sug-
gested international oil spill liability schemes, and the impact the
OPA has had on those involved in the production and transporta-
tion of oil. First, this article will examine the general liability and
compensation system that existed in the United States prior to the
passage of the OPA. Second, significant changes in the liability
system as a result of the passage of the OPA will be reviewed.
Third, this article will discuss some of the suggested domestic and
international approaches that were not adopted. Fourth, this arti-
cle will consider some of the present economic concerns and re-
actions to the OPA and its impact on the consuming public.
Finally, this article will suggest that a cooperative approach be
adopted in developing solutions to the inherent problems in-
volved in apportioning the risks and liabilities for oil pollution
damages.
II. PRE-OPA OIL SPILL LIABILITY
With the 1967 sinking off the British Coast of the oil tanker
Torrey Canyon, the world's attention focused on the issue of oil
pollution damage and cleanup. 4 The grounded Liberian super-
tanker poured 120,000 tons of heavy crude oil onto a hundred
3. See id. at 2-4.
4. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 28, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986) [hereinafter S.
EXEC. REP. No. 28].
2
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miles of the British and French coasts. 5 At that time, the shipping
industry was entitled to limit its liability for oil pollution damages
based upon a statute passed by the United States' Congress in the
19th century. This statute, entitled the Limitation of Liability Act,
was enacted in 1851 to allow a shipper and certain charterers to
limit their liability to the post-accident value of their vessel and
their pending freight.6 The purpose behind the Limitation of Lia-
bility Act of 1851 was to promote investment in the American
shipping industry. 7 The Act sought to provide the American
merchant shipping industry with a competitive edge over Great
Britain, which already provided a similar measure of liability pro-
tection for their shipping industry.8 Since most of the concerns
surrounding the enactment of this statute no longer exist, most
courts and commentators consider it to be hopelessly outdated. 9
Even prior to the enactment of the OPA, the courts slowly began
to weaken and restrict the scope of the Limitation of Liability Act
in oil pollution cases.' 0 The impact of each successive maritime
5. R. MICHAEL M'GONIGLE & MARK W. ZACHER, POLLUTION, POLITICS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1979).
6. 46 U.S.C. §§ 183(a), 186 (1988). As provided in section 183(a) of the
statute:
(a) The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether American or
foreign, for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction by any person of
any property, good, or merchandise shipped or put on board of such
vessel, or for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act,
matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or in-
curred, without the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners, shall
not . . . exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in
such vessel, and her freight then pending.
Id. See also, 46 U.S.C. § 186 (1988) (providing that certain charterers will be
deemed owners for purposes of limitation of liability).
7. Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 385 (1941); University of Texas Medical
Branch v. United States, 557 F.2d 438, 454 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
820 (1978) ("purpose of [act] was to place [United States'] 'mercantile marine
upon the same footing as that of Great Britain' " (citing 23 CONG. GLOBE, 31st
Cong., 2d Sess. 714 (1851) (remarks of Sen. Davis)).
8. GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 10-
3, at 820 (2d ed. 1975).
9. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 437 (1954) (Black,J.
dissenting) ("Many of the conditions in the shipping industry which induced the
1851 Congress to pass the Act no longer prevail"); Esta Later Charters, Inc. v.
Ignacio, 875 F.2d 234, 239 (9th Cir. 1989) (recognizing many consider Act relic
of past). See also, GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 8, at 822 (Act showing increasing
signs of economic obsolescence); Mark E. King, Note, In re Complaint of
Armatur, S.A.: The Limitation of Liability Act and Maritime Environmental Disasters,
21 ENVTL. L. 405 (1991).
10. See, e.g., In Re Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 578-79, 581, 583 (9th Cir.
1991) (Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act implicitly repealed Limitation of
Liability Act); In Re Hokkaido Fisheries Co., 506 F. Supp. 631, 634 (D. Alaska
1981) (Clean Water Act precluded application of Limitation of Liability Act).
1992] 285
3
Donaldson: The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Reaction and Response
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
286 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. III: p. 283
disaster slowly shifted the attention and priorities of the United
States and the world toward the protection of the environment
from marine pollution caused by oil spill accidents.
Prior to the passage of the OPA, the existing federal statutory
regime for oil spill liability and compensation was clearly inade-
quate." I There were four statutes, in addition to the Limitation of
Liability Act of 1851, which addressed certain aspects of oil spill
liability and compensation.' 2 These statutes were known as the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA),13 the provisions
in Title III of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amend-
ments of 1978 (OCSLA),' 4 the Deepwater Port Act of 1974
(DPA),15 and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act
(TAPAA)16.
The FWPCA contained general oil spill cleanup provisions
prior to the passage of the OPA. The FWPCA provided for the
cleanup of oil spills and authorized the federal government to re-
move the oil once it had been discharged, if it was determined
that the owner or operator of the vessel or facility would not
properly remove it themselves.' 7 The FWPCA provided defenses
11. S. REP. No. 94, supra note 4, at 1. The legislative history of the Oil
Pollution Act exhibits substantial Congressional dissatisfaction with the patch-
work of oil pollution protection measures, as exhibited in the following excerpt:
[T]here is a fragmented collection of Federal and State laws providing
inadequate cleanup and damage remedies, taxpayer subsidies to cover
cleanup costs, third party damages that go uncompensated, and sub-
stantial barriers to victim recoveries - such as legal defenses, statutes
of limitation, the corporate form, and the burdens of proof that favor
those responsible for the spill.
Id.
12. Id. at 3.
13. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988), amended by 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1319, 1321,
1324, 1251-1252, 1268-1270 (Supp. 1991).
14. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1866 (1988), repealed by 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1813-1824
(Supp. 1991).
15. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1988), repealed by 33 U.S.C.A. § 1517 (Supp.
1991), amended by 33 U.S.C.A. § 1503 (Supp. 1991).
16. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (1988), repealed by 43 U.S.C.A. § 1653 (Supp.
1991), amended by 43 U.S.C.A. § 1652 (Supp. 1991).
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1) (1988) (ammended 1990). This section pro-
vides:
Whenever any oil or a hazardous substance is discharged, or there is a
substantial threat of such discharge, into or upon the waters of the
United States, adjoining shorelines, or into or upon the waters of the
contiguous zone .... the President is authorized to act to remove or
arrange for the removal of such oil or substance at any time, unless he
determines such removal will be done properly by the owner or opera-
tor of the vessel, onshore facility, or offshore facility from which the
discharge occurs.
Id. Section 1321(a)(2) defines "discharge" as "any spilling, leaking, pumping,
4
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to liability if the owner or operator could prove that the "dis-
charge was caused solely by (A) an act of God, (B) an act of war,
(C) negligence on the part of the United States Government, or
(D) an act or omission of a third party without regard to whether
any such act or omission was or was not negligent."' 18 Addition-
ally, the statute provided for specific dollar limits for cost recov-
ery depending upon the vessel and its size.' 9 The FWPCA's oil
spill liability limitations were considered inordinately lenient, and
provided incomplete coverage for oil pollution damages. 20 How-
ever, unlimited liability for removal costs could be imposed on
the owner or operator of a vessel or facility upon a showing that
the "discharge was the result of willful negligence or willful mis-
conduct within the privity and knowledge of the owner." 21
Other federal laws provided for cleanup costs and damages
associated with specific oil spill matters. OCSLA imposed liability
for the discharge of oil from offshore facilities located on the
Outer Continental Shelf and for vessels transporting oil from
such offshore facilities. 22 The DPA addressed oil spill liability for
owners and operators of vessels and licensees of deepwater
ports. 23 Finally, the TAPAA applied specifically to vessels trans-
pouring, emitting, emptying or dumping, but excludes . .. [any discharges au-
thorized or relating to a permit]." 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(2) (1988).
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (statute permits owner or operator to assert any
combination of these defenses).
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0(1). The statute specifically provides:
[Sluch owner or operator of any vessel from which oil or a hazardous
substance is discharged in violation of subsection (b)(3) of this section
shall, notwithstanding any other provision of law, be liable to the
United States Government for the actual costs incurred under subsec-
tion (c) of this section for the removal of such oil or substance by the
United States Government in an amount not to exceed, in the case of
an inland barge $125 per gross ton of such barge, or $125,000, which-
ever is greater, and in the case of any other vessel, $150 per gross ton
of such vessel (or, for a vessel carrying oil or hazardous substances as
cargo, $250,000), whichever is greater ....
Id.
20. The legislative history of the Oil Pollution Act provides a good picture
of Congress' disdain for the low liability limitations in the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act (FWPCA). See S. REP. No. 94, supra note 1, at 724. As the
legislative history states: "The [FWPCA] ... has historically provided only par-
tial protection. The Act sets inappropriately low limits of liability for owners
and operators of vessels with respect to Federal oil spill removal costs and natu-
ral damages, and provides no coverage or compensation for other damages." Id.
As a result, certain provisions of the FWPCA no longer apply to oil spills where
liability is established under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. See infra note 86 and
accompanying text.
21. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f(1).
22. 43 U.S.C. § 1814.
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1517.
28719921
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porting oil from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline to United States
ports.24 Separate oil spill funds for cleanup costs and damages
were in place under each statute.25 These oil spill funds were
eventually consolidated into the fund established by the OPA.
III. THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990
After approximately 15 years of congressional debate and
various proposed bills, Senate and House members compromised
and enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.26 Interestingly, one of
the previously failed attempts to enact a comprehensive oil pollu-
tion liability and compensation act surrounded the enactment of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).27 CERCLA had initially in-
cluded certain oil spill provisions which were ultimately dropped
prior to the passage of that act.2 s During the process of drafting
the OPA, Congress recognized that the existing patchwork of fed-
eral, state and local laws and regulations addressing oil spill liabil-
ity and cleanup were insufficient. 29 The existing statutes did not
24. 43 U.S.C. § 1653.
25. Walter B. Jones, Oil Compensation and Liability Legislation: When Good
Things Don't Happen to Good Bills, 19 ENVrL. L. REP. 10333, 10333-10334 (1989).
The FWPCA fund was "made up of appropriated monies, recovered costs, and
fines to cover federal government-incurred cleanup costs," and reached a high of
$24 million in 1985. Id. at 10333. "The Trans-Alaskan Pipeline System (TAPS)
created a new fund specifically for marine accidents involving TAPS oil.., the
TAPS fund is derived not through appropriated, taxpayer monies . . . but
through a five cent per barrel fee on oil carried by vessels leaving the pipeline
terminus in Valdez, Alaska." Id. at 10334. The Deepwater Port Act created a
fund similar to the TAPS fund, with liability limits of $20 million for vessels and
$50 million for offshore oil ports covered by this act. Id. The OCSLA Amend-
ments established another federal oil spill fund "with $200 million to cover
spills from offshore production facilities and vessels transporting oil from these
facilities." Id. at 10335.
26. Phil Kuntz, Oil Spill Liability Negotiators Find Another Sticking Point, 48
CONG. Q. 1261 (Apr. 28, 1990).
27. Jones, infra note 25, at 10335.
28. Id. The Love Canal and Times Beach incidents prompted Congress to
direct its attention toward a hazardous substances liability and compensation
statute and away from oil spills. Id. Serious consideration was given to combin-
ing the hazardous substances and oil spill bills, but this proposal was eventually
dropped in order to ensure the enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 33 U.S.C.A.
§§ 9601-9675 (Supp. 1991), with its coverage restricted to cleanup of hazardous
substances. H.R. REP. No. 242, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 32 (1989) [here-
inafter H.R. REP. No. 242]. Despite assurances to move the oil spill provisions
quickly through the next Congress, politics and other delays prevented the pas-
sage of an oil spill statute until the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. See Jones, supra
note 25.
29. H.R. REP. No. 242, supra note 28, at 32.
6
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adequately address oil spill liability and compensation. 30 A long
process of compromise and drafting produced the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990.31 This legislation has provided a comprehensive ap-
proach to oil spill prevention, response, liability and
compensation.
A responsible party under the OPA is defined to include "any
person owning, operating or demise chartering" a vessel. 32 Addi-
tionally, responsible parties include, with certain exceptions, the
owners or operators of onshore and offshore facilities, the licen-
see of deepwater ports, any owner or operator of a pipeline, and
all responsible parties of abandoned vessels or facilities.3 3 Third
parties may also be treated as responsible parties for the purposes
30. S. REP. No. 94, supra note 1, at 3.
31. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104
Stat.) 484 (enacted August 18, 1990) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761; 26
U.S.C. §§ 4611, 9509 along with certain conforming amendments to other
statutes).
32. Oil Pollution Act § 1001(32)(A), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2701(32)(A). The ac-
tual language of the statutory definition is even more inclusive, stating:
(32) "responsible party" means the following"
(A) VESSELS. - In the case of a vessel, any person owning,
operating, or demise chartering the vessel.
(B) ONSHORE FACILITIES. - In the case of an onshore fa-
cility (other than a pipeline), any person owning or operating the
facility, except a Federal agency, State, municipality, commission,
or political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body, that as the
owner transfers possession and right to use the property to an-
other person by lease, assignment, or permit.
(C) OFFSHORE FACILITIES. - In the case of an offshore
facility (other than a pipeline or a deepwater port licensed under
the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (33 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.)), the
lessee or permittee of the area in which the facility is located or the
holder of a right of use and easement granted under applicable
State law or the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C.
1301-1356) for the area in which the facility is located (if the
holder is a different person than the lessee or permittee), except a
Federal agency, State, municipality, commission, or political subdi-
vision of a State, or any interstate body, that as owner transfers
possession and right to use the property to another person by
lease, assignment, or permit.
(D) DEEPWATER PORTS. - In the case of a deepwater port
licensed under the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (33 U.S.C. 1501-
1524), the licensee.
(E) PIPELINES. - In the case of a pipeline, any person own-
ing or operating the pipeline.
(F) ABANDONMENT. - In the case of an abandoned vessel,
onshore facility, deepwater port, pipeline, or offshore facility, the
persons who would have been responsible parties immediately
prior to the abandonment of the vessel or facility.
Id.
33. Id. § 1001(32)(B)(C)(D)(E)(F), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2701(32)(B)(C)(D)(E)(F).
For the full text of § 100 1(32), see supra note 32.
19921 289
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of determining liability under the OPA, if the responsible party
can show that a discharge or threat of discharge and the resulting
removal cost and/or damages were caused solely by the act or
omission of the third party.3 4 Responsible parties will be liable
for the discharge or substantial threat of discharge of oil into or
upon the navigable waters, adjoining shorelines or the exclusive
economic zone of the United States.3 5
Consistent with prior developments in the law and policy, the
OPA specifically superseded the Limitation of Liability Act of
1851 with respect to the prevention of liability for the discharge
or substantial threat of the discharge of oil.36 Had the OPA not
specifically superseded the Limitation Liability Act of 1851, the
purpose behind the Act could have easily been subverted. Con-
gress recognized that the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 was
clearly outdated and inconsistent with the intended liability and
compensation scheme for parties responsible for oil pollution.3 7
The OPA now governs all compensation actions for removal costs
and damages for oil pollution notwithstanding the Limitation of
Liability Act of 1851.38
The standard of liability for owners or operators of any ves-
34. Id. § 1002(d)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C.A. 2702(d)(1)(A).
35. Id. § 1002(a), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a). Section 1002(a) provides:
[E]ach responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is dis-
charged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into
or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive
economic zone is liable for the removal costs and damages . . . that
result from such incident.
Id.
36. Id. § 1018(c), 33 U.S.C.A. § 27 18(c). Directly contravening the Limita-
tion of Liability Act of 1851 with respect to oil spills, the Oil Pollution Act ex-
plicitly provided that:
Nothing in this Act, the Act of March 3, 1851 (46 U.S.C. 183 et. seq.),
or section 9509 or the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C.
9509), shall in any way affect, or be construed to affect, the authority of
the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof -
(1) to impose additional liability or additional requirements;
or
(2) to impose, or to determine the amount of, any fine or pen-
alty (whether criminal or civil in nature) for any violation of law;
relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a discharge, of oil.
Id.
37. S. REP. No. 94, supra note 1, at 14.
38. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 103, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 781 [hereinafter referred to as H.R. CONF. REP. No. 653].
The Conference Report states in pertinent part:
Liability under this Act is established notwithstanding any other provi-
sion or rule of law. This means that liability provisions of this Act would
govern compensation for removal costs and damages notwithstanding
any limitations under existing statutes such as [the Limitation of Liabil-
8
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sel, onshore or offshore facility for the discharge or substantial
threat of discharge of oil is strict, joint and several. 3a9 Each re-
sponsible party will be liable for the removal costs incurred by the
United States, a State or Indian tribe under the provisions of the
FWPCA, the Intervention on the High Seas Act or under any state
law. 40 The responsible party will also be liable for any removal
costs incurred by any person as the result that person's cleanup
activities undertaken consistent with the National Contingency
Plan.4 1 If a responsible party voluntarily undertakes to clean up
an oil spill it may be entitled to credit those amounts spent in the
voluntary cleanup against its ultimate liability under the OPA.42
Additionally, when a third party is solely responsible for an oil
spill and the responsible party incurs all removal costs and dam-
ages, it will then be subrogated to all rights of the United States
and other claimants to recover those removal costs and damages
against that third party.43
The OPA expands the scope of recoverable damages by spe-
cifically enumerating six categories of damages for which respon-
sible parties will be liable.44 These damages include: natural
resources damages;45 "damages for injury to, or economic losses
ity Act of 1851] ... , or under existing requirements that physical dam-
age to the proprietary interest of the claimant be shown.
Id. at 103.
39. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 653, supra note 38, at 102 (standard of liability
held to be consistent with that under the FWPCA).
40. Oil Pollution Act § 1002(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(1)(A). "Re-
moval costs" are defined as "the costs of removal that are incurred after a dis-
charge of oil has occurred or, in any case in which there is a substantial threat of
a discharge of oil, the costs to prevent, minimize, or mitigate oil pollution from
such an incident." Id. § 1001(31).
41. Id. § 1002(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(l)(B).
42. Id. § 1004(a), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704(a). The liability limits imposed under
the OPA are calculated to include "any removal costs incurred by, or on behalf
of, the responsible party." Id. Under the FWPCA, a responsible party who un-
dertook to clean up an oil spill itself would not be entitled to credit those
amounts against its ultimate liability. See United States v. Dixie Carriers, 736
F.2d 180, 183 (5th Cir. 1984). Commentators have recognized that such a pro-
vision acted as a disincentive for vessel owners and operators to voluntarily at-
tempt to clean up oil spills. See Antonio J. Rodriguez & Paul Jaffe, The Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 15 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 5 n.23 (1990) [hereinafter Rodriguez &
Jaffe].
43. Id. § 1002(d)(l)(B), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(d)(1)(B).
44. Id. § 1002(b)(2), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(2).
45. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(2)(A). Section 1002(b), enti-
tled "Covered Removal Costs and Damages," includes the following definition
of damages to natural resources: "Damages for injury to, destruction of, loss of,
or loss of use of, natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing
the damage." Id. § 1002(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(2)(A). "Natural re-
sources" are defined in § 1001(20) to include "land, fish, wildlife, biota, air,
19921
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resulting from destruction of, real or personal property;" 46 dam-
ages for "loss of subsistence use of natural resources.... without
regard to the ownership or management of the resources;" 47
"damages for the net loss of taxes, royalties, rents, fees, or net
profit shares due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real ... [or]
personal property, or natural resources;" 48 damages for "loss of
profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, de-
struction, or loss of real [or personal] . . . property, or natural
resources;" 49 and "[d]amages for "net costs of providing in-
creased or additional public services during or after removal
activities." 50
water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources belong-
ing to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by
the United States .... , any state or local government or Indian tribe, or any
foreign government." Id.
In general, the measure of natural resources damages under the OPA shall
be:
(A) the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring the
equivalent of, the damaged natural resources;
(B) the diminution in value of those natural resources pending restora-
tion, plus
(C) the reasonable cost of assessing those damages.
Id. § 1006(d)(1), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2706(d)(1). Additionally, the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), in consultation with other agencies,
is to promulgate regulations for the assessment of natural resources damages.
Id. § 1006(e)(1), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2706(e)(1). On March 13, 1992, NOAA pub-
lished an advance notice of proposed rulemaking concerning these damage as-
sessment regulations. 57 Fed. Reg. 8964 (1992). NOAA indicated that it will
publish these proposed regulations by the statutory deadline of August 18,
1992. Id. Any assessment or determination of natural resources damages made
in accordance with the statute and the regulations to be promulgated shall have
the force and effect of a rebuttable presumption in favor of the trustee seeking
recovery against the responsible party. Id. § 1006(e)(2), 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 2706(e)(2).
46. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(2)(B).
47. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(C), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(2)(C). "Subsistence use of
natural resources" is not a defined term in the OPA. However, a Senate Report
did discuss the recoverability of economic damages for both loss of use and loss
of subsistence use of natural resources. S. REP. No. 94, supra note 1, at 12. In
discussing these damages, the Senate Report recognized that "fishermen, for
example, would not only receive the equivalent of unemployment compensa-
tion, but would also receive compensation to prevent loss of [their] .. .boat."
Id. The Senate Report stated that "[lost wages are of limited value if the means
of earning the wages, such as a boat, go uncompensated." Id. The example of a
commercial fishermen was also used in the portion of the House Conference
Report discussing the ability of a claimant under section 1002(b)(2)(E) of the Oil
Pollution Act to recover for loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity
resulting from injury to property or natural resources. H.R. CONF. REP. No.
653, supra note 38, at 103.
48. Oil Pollution Act § 1002(b)(2)(D), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(2)(D).
49. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(E), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(2)(E).
50. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(F), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(2)(F). These recoverable
10
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Natural resource damages are recoverable by trustees of the
United States, state trustees, Indian tribe trustees, or by foreign
trustees. 51 The OPA also allows the federal and state govern-
ments to recover for loss of taxes, royalties, rents, fees or net
profits due to injury or loss to property or natural resources. 52 In
addition, the net costs for providing "increased or additional
public services during or after removal activities" will be recover-
able by the affected states or local governments. 53
Individuals are now entitled to recover damages for a loss of
profits or impairment of earning capacity from injury to property
or natural resources. 54 As a result, a responsible party now may
be liable to an individual claimant not only for injury or damage
to the claimant's property, 55 but also for the claimant's lost profits
or impairment of earning capacity56 and any loss of subsistence
use of natural resources 5 7 regardless of ownership of the dam-
aged property or resources. 58 Many of these specific damage cat-
egories were not compensable under pre-existing law. 59
The OPA provides defenses to a responsible party if the dis-
costs include "protection from fire, safety, or health hazards, caused by a dis-
charge of oil." Id.
51. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(A), 1006(a), 33 U.S.C.A. 2702(b)(2)(A), 2706(a).
52. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(D), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(2)(D).
53. Oil Pollution Act § 1002(b)(2)(F), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(2)(F).
54. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(E), 33 U.S.C.A. 2702(b)(2)(E). The House Conference
Report discusses the ability of claimants to recover under section 1002(b)(2)(E)
of the Oil Pollution Act as follows: "The claimant need not be the owner of the
damaged property or resources to recover for lost profits or income. For exam-
ple, a fisherman may recover lost income due to damaged fisheries resources,
even though the fisherman does not own those resources." H.R. CONF. REP. No.
653, supra note 38, at 103. However, the House Conference Report does not
really help define the scope of claimants allowed to recover under this provision,
since commercial fishermen had already been identified as a specific group enti-
tled to recover for economic losses resulting from damage or injury to natural
resources. See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1026 (5th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986) (discussing Union Oil Co. v. Oppen,
501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974)); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th
Cir. 1974) (identifying economic losses suffered by commercial fishermen being
of a "particular and special nature"). See also Rodriguez &Jaffe, supra, note 42,
at 14-15 (discussing commercial fishing exception).
55. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(2)(B).
56. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(E), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(2)(E).
57. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(C), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(2)(C).
58. See supra notes 47 and 54 and accompanying text.
59. In the past, under general maritime law, a claimant could not recover
for economic losses without establishing some direct physical harm or damage
to its person or property. See Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S.
303 (1927); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir.
1985), cert denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509 (D.
Alaska 1991).
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charge or substantial threat of discharge of oil was "caused solely
by an act of God; an act of war; an act or omission of a third
party." 60 A responsible party may assert any combination of
these defenses. 6' However, these defenses may not be asserted if
the responsible party fails to report a spill, does not cooperate
with the responsible official in connection with removal activities,
or fails to comply with any applicable orders issued.62 In some
cases, a responsible party will not be liable to a claimant if the oil
spill was caused by the gross negligence or willful misconduct of
that particular claimant. 63
As would be expected, the limits of liability for a responsible
party under the OPA are significantly higher than they were
under the FWPCA. Under the OPA, a tank vessel's liability for
"each incident shall not exceed.., the greater of [either] $1,200
per gross ton [or] . . .$10,000,000" if the vessel is greater than
3,000 gross tons or $2,000,000 if the vessel is 3,000 gross tons or
less.6 Additionally, other vessels are liable for $600 per gross
ton or $500,000, whichever is greater.65 Any onshore facility or
deepwater port is liable up to $350,000,000.66 The liability limit
60. Oil Pollution Act § 1003(a)(1)(2)(3), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2703(a)(1)(2)(3).
To be entitled to assert the third party defense, the third party must not be an
employee or agent of the responsible party or a third party whose act or omis-
sion occurred in connection with any contractual relationship with the responsi-
ble party. Id. § 1003(a)(3), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2703(a)(3). Additionally under the
third-party defense, the responsible party must establish, by a preponderance of
the evidence that it:
(A) exercised due care with respect to the oil concerned, taking into
consideration the characteristics of the oil and in light of all rele-
vant facts and circumstances; and
(B) took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such
third party and the foreseeable consequences of those acts or
omissions.
Id.
61. Id. § 1003(a)(4), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2703(a)(4).
62. Id. § 1003(c), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2703(c).
63. Id. § 1003(b), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2703(b).
64. Id. § 1004(a)(1), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704(a)(1). See supra note 20 and accom-
panying text.
65. Oil Pollution Act § 1004(a)(2), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704(a)(2).
66. Id. § 1004(a)(4), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704(a)(4). The President has been
given the authority to take into account the "size, storage capacity.., proximity
to sensitive areas, type of oil handled, history of discharges, and other factors
relevant to risks posed by the class or category of facility" in adjusting, by regu-
lation, a limit of liability for any particular class of category of onshore facility.
Id. § 1004(d)(l), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704(d)(1). Additionally the Coast Guard has
been given the authority to conduct a study on the relative operational and envi-
ronmental risks posed by transportation of oil to deepwater ports and authority
to institute a rulemaking procedure to lower the limits of liability if found to be
appropriate. Id. § 1004(d)(2), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704(d)(2).
12
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for offshore facilities, except deepwater ports, is the total of all
removal costs plus $75,000,000.67 All mobile offshore drilling
units are first to be treated as tank vessels for liability purposes
and then as offshore facilities for excess liability. 68
The liability limits under the OPA do not apply if the incident
in question was caused by the responsible party's gross negli-
gence or willful misconduct or violation of an applicable federal
safety, construction or operating regulation. 69 Additionally, lia-
bility cannot be limited if the responsible party: (1) fails to report
the oil spill as required by law and knows or has reason to know of
the spill; (2) fails to provide reasonable cooperation and assist-
ance requested by and in connection with the removal activities;
(3) or fails to comply with an order regarding the removal
activities. 70
Under the OPA, "responsible part[ies] . . . [must] establish
and maintain ... evidence of financial responsibility sufficient to
meet the maximum amount of liability to which ... the responsi-
ble party [would] be subject" in cases where the liability limits
apply. 7 1 These certificates of financial responsibility are required
for any vessel over 300 gross tons using any place subject to the
67. Id. § 1004(a)(3), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704(a)(3).
68. Id. § 1004(b), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704(b).
69. Id. § 1004(c)(1), 33 U.S.C.A § 2704(c)(1). The acts of a responsible
party include those acts undertaken by an agent or employee of the responsible
party, or a person acting pursuant to a contractual relationship with the respon-
sible party. Id. § 1004(c), 33 U.S.C.A § 2704(c).
In order for the limits of liability not to apply, the violation of a federal
regulation or standard by the responsible party or by those acting on its behalf
should not be trivial or unrelated to the discharge of oil. S. REP. No. 94, supra
note 1, at 14. However, the Senate Report indicated that:
A limit on liability is clearly of benefit to an owner or operator subject
to the provisions of this legislation. Such a benefit should not be con-
ferred, however, in instances where the conduct of the owner or opera-
tor indicates that such owner or operator is not, in good faith,
attempting to comply with the applicable regulations or statutory re-
quirements. In these instances, where compliance perhaps could have
prevented or mitigated the effects of an oil spill, no such limits will
apply.
Id.
70. Oil Pollution Act § 1004(c)(2), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704(c)(2).
71. Id. § 1016, 33 U.S.C.A. § 2716. The Coast Guard recently published a
notice of proposed rulemaking concerning regulations that will implement the
financial responsibility requirements established under the OPA. 56 Fed. Reg.
49006 (1991) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. Parts 130, 131, 132 and 137) (pro-
posed September 26, 1991). In the notice of proposed rulemaking, the Coast
Guard recognized that some vessel owners may encounter difficulty in obtaining
these certificates of financial responsibility once the proposed rules go into ef-
fect. Id. at 49008. For further discussion of the financial responsibility require-
ments under the OPA, see infra notes 221-30 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction of the United States, 72 or any vessel that operates in
the exclusive economic zone of the United States to transport oil
destined for the United States. 73 A vessel that does not comply
with these provisions is subject to the government withholding
clearance of the vessel, denying entry or detaining the vessel or to
the actual seizure and forfeiture of the vessel to the United
States. 74 A claimant under the OPA has the right to pursue a di-
rect action for removal costs and damages against the guarantor
which provides the certificate of financial responsibility. 75 How-
ever, in a direct action suit, the guarantor is allowed to assert the
rights and defenses available to the responsible party under the
OPA; any insurance policy defenses approved under the Act; or
"the defense that the incident was caused by the willful miscon-
duct of the responsible party." 76 The guarantor will not be liable
for any removal costs or damages which exceed the amounts re-
quired under the certificate of responsibility. 77
These increased financial responsibility requirements under
the OPA have produced some dramatic responses by the insur-
ance industry. The protection and indemnity clubs (P & I clubs)
that have traditionally insured a large majority of the world's
shipping industry have, since the enactment of the OPA, insisted
that they will not issue the certificates of financial responsibility as
now required under the statute.78 Further, it has been predicted
that the P & I clubs will refuse to provide coverage if the pro-
posed regulations covering financial responsibility under the
OPA are adopted. 79
The enactment of the OPA put to an end, for the time being,
the continuing debate between the House and Senate regarding
preemption of state oil spill cleanup and compensation statutes.80
72. Oil Pollution Act § 1016(a)(l), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2716(a)(1) (exceptions for
non-self-propelled vessel that does not carry oil as cargo or fuel).
73. Id. § 1016(a)(2), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2716(a)(2).
74. Id. § 1016(b)(1)(2)(3), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2716(b)(1)(2)(3).
75. Id. § 1016(f), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2716(f).
76. Id.
77. Oil Pollution Act § 1016(g), 33 U.S.C.A. § 27 16(g).
78. William DiBeneditto, Lines Hit Coast Guard on Solvency Regulations, J.
CoM., Feb. 4, 1992, at 8B.
79. Charles Anderson, Oil Pollution Act Fouls the Regulatory Waters, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 20, 1992, at A18.
80. For years, the Senate and the House argued over whether a federal oil
spill law should be allowed to preempt state oil spill statutes. See Kuntz, supra
note 26 at 1261 ("[t]he Senate for years refused to allow federal law to pre-empt
state laws, and its insistence on that point blocked action [to enact a federal
statute]").
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The OPA granted states the authority to impose additional liabil-
ity and/or requirements with respect to the discharge or threat of
discharge of oil in their respective states.8' Under the OPA, the
states' authority to establish and maintain oil spill funds was pre-
served. s2 The states can also require anyone to contribute to
their funds.83 Responsible parties will still be subject to any fines
Certain members of the Senate believed that the states should be entitled to
retain and/or establish more stringent liability schemes than provided by a fed-
eral oil spill statute. Senator George J. Mitchell expressed the following view:
Equally important is the fact that this legislation does not prevent
States from [enacting more stringent oil spill liability laws] .... States
are entitled to maintain or enact oil spill liability and compensation leg-
islation as well as emergency response laws .... For 8 long years I have
struggled to enact oil spill legislation that is protective of the public
health and the environment and that does not remove the rights of
States to take whatever additional action they believe necessary to pro-
tect their waters and their citizens from oil spills.
135 CONG. REC. S9692 (daily ed. August 3, 1989) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
On the other hand, the proponents of the preemption of the state law in the
House believed that such an approach would promote a single comprehensive
system allowing for quick response to cleanup and compensation for damages.
Representative Shumway stated that:
As far as Federal preemption of State laws [is concerned], the House
has passed this provision on at least five occasions in the past and in
fact has previously defeated efforts on the floor to do away with
preemption.
Preemption is needed to ensure that there is one unified, simple
comprehensive system available to finance full cleanup and pay fully for
damages.
Without preemption, we are left with the existing patchwork of
confusing and sometimes competing Federal and State laws which
cause delays in cleanup and further damage to the environment. No
preemption.., will result in more litigation and it will actually be worse
for the environment.
135 Cong. Rec. H7959 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. Shumway).
81. Oil Pollution Act § 1018(a)(1), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2718(a)(1).
82. Id. § 1018(b)(1), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2718(b)(1). Even prior to the enact-
ment of the Oil Pollution Act, it was reported that twenty-four states had en-
acted comprehensive oil pollution statutes and at least twelve states had oil spill
funds. S. REP. No. 94, supra note 1, at 6. The list of states enacting oil spill
statutes continues to grow. For a list of the states that, as of 1990, had enacted
such oil spill legislation, see Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra, note 42, at 10 n.66.
A recent example of the creation of a state oil spill fund can be found in the
Texas Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1991. Under this Act, the
Coastal Protection Fund was created to "provide immediately available funds for
response to all unauthorized discharges, for cleanup of pollution from unau-
thorized discharges of oil, and for payment of damages from unauthorized dis-
charges of oil." TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 40.151 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
83. Oil Pollution Act § 1018(b)(2), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2718(b)(2). For example,
pursuant to the Texas Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1991, the
Coastal Protection Fund is funded by imposing a two cent per barrel fee on
-every person owning crude oil in a vessel at the time such crude oil is trans-
ferred to or from a marine terminal." TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 40.154(a).
See Michael K. Bell & James T. Brown, The Texas Oil Spill Prevention and Response
29719921
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or penalties (criminal or civil) the state deems necessary to im-
pose for actual or threatened oil spills within its borders.8 4 The
issue of preemption of state law divided the Congress for years.
Finally, the House agreed to reverse its stance on preemption of
state oil spill statutes, and the OPA, as enacted, has preserved
states' autonomy over oil spill liability and regulation. However,
the existence of duplicative state oil pollution statutes may create
an inconsistent legal and regulatory framework that the House in-
itially sought to avoid.8 5
Conforming amendments are contained in the OPA which
specifically amend, repeal or supersede various aspects of other
oil spill statutes. Certain sections of the FWPCA concerning oil
spill liability were superseded to the extent the provisions of the
OPA applied.8 6 The fund established under the FWPCA was re-
pealed and all amounts remaining in the FWPCA fund were to be
incorporated into the new oil spill fund created by the OPA.8 7
The DPA was amended to adopt the financial responsibility provi-
sions of the OPA.88 Also, all amounts remaining in the Deepwa-
ter Port Fund were to be transferred into the new fund under the
OPA.8 9 Title III of the OCSLA was repealed by the OPA.90 All
funds remaining in the Offshore Oil Pollution Fund under OC-
SLA were to be deposited in the new OPA fund.91 Finally, certain
provisions of the TAPAA which had provided for the reservation
of amounts to its fund for existing claims were repealed, with the
remaining amount (after certain rebates to the State of Alaska) to
Act of 1991: Liability v. Responsibility, 29 Hous. LAw. 42 (Jan.-Feb. 1992) (discuss-
ing provisions of Texas Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1991 including
the provisions on the Coastal Protection Fund).
84. Oil Pollution Act § 1018(c), 33 U.S.C.A § 2718(c).
85. See 135 CONG. REC. H7959 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1969) (statement of Rep.
Shumway) ("[w]ithout preemption, we are left with the existing patchwork of
confusing and sometimes competing Federal and State laws..."); H. REP. No.
242, supra note 28, at 34 (the House bill sought to establish "a clear and predict-
able legal and regulatory framework within which actual or potential claimants,
spillers, and insurers will be able to make decisions relevant to oil pollution
matters.").
86. Oil Pollution Act § 2002(a), 33 U.S.C.A. § 132 1(a) (subsections (f), (g),
(h) and (i) of 33 U.S.C. § 1321 of FWPCA no longer apply with respect to any
incident for which liability is established under the Oil Pollution Act).
87. Id. § 2002(b), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(b) (subsections (k) and (p) of 33
U.S.C. § 1321 of FWPCA were repealed by the OPA. All amounts remaining in
the fund established under subsection (k) were to be deposited into the new
OPA Fund).
88. Id. § 2003(a), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1503(a).
89. Id. § 2003(b), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1517(b).
90. Id. § 2004, 26 U.S.C.A. § 9509.
91. Oil Pollution Act § 2004, 26 U.S.C.A. § 9509.
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be eventually deposited in the new fund under the OPA.9 2
The funds previously established under other statutes were
consolidated into the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OPA
Fund).93 The OPA Fund is available for payment of removal costs
and other costs, expenses, claims and damages available under
the Act.9 4 Nevertheless, the OPA Fund will not be available to
pay claims to any claimants causing the incident in question by
their own gross negligence or willful misconduct.95 The OPA
Fund is normally available only after the claim has first been
presented to the responsible party or guarantor.96 However, a
direct presentation to the OPA Fund can be made if the responsi-
ble party denies liability for the incident, or cannot be identified,
or if the source of discharge was a public vessel. 97 Also, a respon-
sible party will be able to assert a claim against the OPA Fund if
the responsible party is entitled to a defense or has reached its
liability limit under the statute.9 8 Further, a claimant may com-
mence an action in court against the responsible party or guaran-
tor if its claim is not settled within 90 days after it was presented
to the responsible party9 9 or after the advertising procedures are
commenced under the statute. 00 Alternatively, a claimant may
92. Id. § 8102, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1653.
93. Id. § 9001, 26 U.S.C.A. § 9509. The OPA Fund is financed by a five-
cent-per-barrel tax on all imported and domestic oil. 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 4611(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1991).
94. Oil Pollution Act § 1012(a), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2712(a).
95. Id. § 1012(b), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2712(b).
96. Id. § 1013(a), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2713(a).
97. Id. § 1013(b)(l)(A), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2713(b)(1)(A). Section 1014(c) de-
scribes the procedures and circumstances under which a direct claim can be
made to the Oil Pollution Act Fund:
The President shall advertise or otherwise notify potential claimants of
the procedures for direct presentation of their claims to the OPA Fund,
if:
(1) the responsible party and the guarantor both deny designation [by
the President of the responsible party's vessel or facility as the
source of discharge or threat of discharge of oil] ....
(2) the source of the discharge or threat was a public vessel, or
(3) the President is unable to designate the source or sources of the
discharge or threat ...
Id. § 1014(c), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2714(c).
98. Id. § 1013(b)(1)(B), 1008(a), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2713(b)(1)(B), 2708(a). Ifa
responsible party is entitled to limit its liability, then the responsible party may
only assert a claim against the OPA Fund for amounts in excess of its liability
limits under the statute. Id. § 1008(b), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2708(b).
99. Oil Pollution Act § 1013(c), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2713(c). The claimant may
also bring an action against the responsible party or guarantor if liability for the
claim is denied. Id. § 1013(c)(1), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2713(c)(1).
100. Id. The President is to designate the source or sources of a discharge
or threat of a discharge of oil and notify the responsible party and the guarantor
19921 299
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choose to present its unsettled claim to the OPA Fund.' 0 ' Regu-
lations are to be promulgated by the President regarding the
claim "presentation, filing, processing, settlement and adjudica-
tion" procedures for the OPA fund. 10 2 Maximum expenditure
per incident by the OPA Fund has been expanded to
$1,000,000,000.103
Another important aspect of the OPA Fund is the authority
of state officials, in certain cases, to immediately draw up to
$250,000 from the fund for removal costs consistent with the Na-
tional Contingency Plan.' 04 This provides "a mechanism for im-
mediate response by [a State] to discharges of oil posing a
substantial threat to the public health or welfare."' 10 5 Any pay-
ment of claims or obligations by the OPA Fund are "subject to
the United States Government acquiring by subrogation all rights
of the claimant or State to recover from the responsible party."10 6
However, the OPA Fund will be subrogated only to the extent
that the responsible party is liable given any limits or defenses to
liability. 10 7 Since the OPA Fund is financed by a five cent per bar-
rel tax on imported and domestic oil °S, the costs associated with
an oil spill will be compensated not just within the spiller's limits
of liability, but "through a mechanism which spreads these excess
costs to all users of oil."109
Several provisions enacted under the OPA were directed at
the prevention and removal of oil spills, l 10 the protection of
Prince William Sound,"' oil pollution research and develop-
ment,"t 2 and the Trans-Alaska pipeline system."l 3 The preven-
tion and removal provisions include, among other things,
additional requirements and procedures for the issuance and re-
of this designation. Id. § 1014(a), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2714(a). See also § 1014(b), 33
U.S.C.A. § 2714(b).
101. Oil Pollution Act § 1013(c), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2713(c). In addition, the
claimant may present claims for uncompensated damages and removal costs to
the OPA Fund. Id. at § 1013(d), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2713(d).
102. Id. § 1013(e), 33 U.S.C.A § 2713(e).
103. Id. § 9001(c), 26 U.S.C.A § 9509(c).
104. Id. § 1012(d)(l), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2712(d)(1).
105. H. R. CONF. REP. No. 653, supra note 38, at 115.
106. Oil Pollution Act § 1012(f), 33 U.S.C.A § 2712(f).
107. S. REP. No. 94, supra note 1, at 5.
108. 26 U.S.C. § 4611(c)(2)(B).
109. S. REP. No. 94, supra note 1, at 6.
110. Oil Pollution Act, Title IV.
111. Id. Title V.
112. Id. Title VII.
113. Id. Title VIII.
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view of licenses, certificates of registry and merchant mariner's
documents."I4 Of particular importance, the OPA directed the
use of double hulls on all tank vessels by the year 2015.1 15
The OPA consolidated previously enacted oil spill liability
and compensation statutes. This new statute was enacted in re-
sponse to the marine pollution disasters at that time. However,
other approaches were considered prior to the enactment of the
OPA.
IV. PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED APPROACHES
A. International Liability and Compensation Conventions
The world's attention focused on the problem of marine pol-
lution caused by oil tanker spills with the wreck of the Torrey
Canyon in May, 1967.' 16 Consequently, in 1969, an international
conference sponsored by the Intragovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization (now known as the International Maritime
Organization) (IMO),"17 convened to address marine pollution
problems caused by oil spills. Two conventions were adopted at
that conference. One of the conventions, the International Con-
vention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC), 18 ad-
dressed the issues of liability and compensation for international
oil spill pollution. 19 At the time this convention was drafted, the
potential recovery under the CLC for cleanups and compensation
was considered inadequate.' 20 The inadequacies were to be ad-
114. Id. §§4101-4103, 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 7101, 7106, 7107, 7109, 7302,
7701-03.
115. Oil Pollution Act § 4115, 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1274(a), 3703a, 3715(a).
116. See Linda Rosenthal & Carol Raper, Amoco Cadiz and Limitation of Liabil-
ity for Oil Spill Pollution: Domestic and International Solutions, 5 VA. J. NAT. RE-
SOURCES L. 259, 278 (1985).
117. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a London-based
specialized agency of the United Nations which addresses issues involving the
prevention of marine pollution by means of international treaties and non-bind-
ing instruments. International Maritime Organization, Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA)
41:1001 (1987).
118. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,
Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970) [hereinafter CLC].
119. Id. at preamble.
120. Beth Van Hanswyk, The 1984 Protocols to the International Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damages and the International Fund for Compensation for
Oil Pollution Damages: An Option for Needed Reforms in the United States Law, 22 INTr'L
LAw. 319, 322 (1988) [hereinafter Van Hanswyk]. "The CLC was designed to be
the exclusive source of recovery for pollution damages against the shipowner."
Id. at 322. The maximum liability imposed on any one vessel was approximately
$18.9 million, and "[e]ven in 1969, the amounts provided for under the CLC
were considered inadequate." Id.
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dressed by an international oil spill fund which was to supplement
the amounts recoverable under the CLC.12 1 Thereafter, in 1971,
the International Convention on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (Fund
Convention) was adopted. 122 The Fund Convention supple-
mented the limits established by the CLC in order to ensure that
full compensation would be available to victims of oil pollution
incidents. 123
The United States did not ratify either convention due to ar-
guments that coverage under each convention was inadequate to
pay for damages from major oil spills.' 2 4 Another concern with
each convention was the fear that state oil pollution statutes
would be preempted by the international conventions, leaving
open the potential for uncompensated damage claims in the event
of a major oil spill. 125
An IMO Diplomatic Conference was held in London in 1984
to address concerns about the inadequate liability limits and the
other shortcomings of the CLC and the Fund Convention. 26
The United States was invited to attend, 27 and took an active role
in the conference. 28 The conference produced the Protocol of
121. Van Hanswyk, supra note 120, at 322-23.
122. International Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, December 18, 1971, 11
I.L.M. 284 (1972) [hereinafter Fund Convention].
123. Fund Convention, supra note 122, at 284-85. The Fund is financed
through contributions by oil companies that receive more than 150,000 tons of
oil imports per year in the contracting nation. Id. art. 10, para. 1(a). The con-
tracting nation had the option of assuming the obligations of the oil companies
to make contributions to the Fund. Id. art. 14(1).
124. S. EXEC. REP. No. 28, supra note 4, at 2. "As the CLC was being nego-
tiated, it became apparent that the liability limits established under its provisions
were likely to be insufficient to cover many significant oil spills." Id. "The U.S.
failed to ratify either convention largely because critics argued that the
1969/1971 CLC/Fund coverage was inadequate." Id.
125. Id.
126. See Douglas A. Jacobsen & James D. Yellen, Oil Pollution: The 1984
London Protocols and the Amoco Cadiz, 15J. MAR. L. & CoM. 467, 480 (1984).
127. See Technical Report of the Department of State 5 (Oct. 7, 1985), reprinted in,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 12, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter Technical Re-
port]. All members of the IMO, members of the United Nations were allowed to
participate in the Diplomatic Conference regardless of whether they were mem-
bers of the original conventions. Id.
128. See Letter of Submittal of Department of State vi-vii (Oct. 7, 1985), reprinted
in, S. TREATY Doc. No. 12, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter Letter of
Submittal]. On Oct. 7, 1985, the Department of State submitted to the President
the 1984 Protocols for transmittal to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification. The Department of State reported: "The Department of Transpor-
tation and State coordinated with interested agencies of the Federal Govern-
ment in negotiating the Protocols .... Members of these groups served on the
20
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1984 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 (CLC Protocol), 2 9 and the Proto-
col of 1984 to Amend the International Fund for Compensation
for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971 (Fund Protocol).' 30 The United
States signed these Protocols on February 12, 1985,13' but they
have yet to be ratified by the Senate.' 3 2
The 1984 Protocols provided increased liability limits and ex-
panded the scope of compensation. Much like the OPA, the CLC
Protocol imposes strict liability upon the vessel owner up to a
specified monetary limit.' 33 Under the CLC Protocol, a vessel
owner's strict liability for any one incident is limited to 3 million
"units of account" for a ship not exceeding 5,000 units of ton-
nage - amounting to a liability limit of approximately $4.32 mil-
lion.' 34 For ships in excess of 5,000 units of tonnage, each
additional unit of tonnage adds another 420 "units of account,"
up to a limit of 59.7 million units of account, or $85.9 million.' 3 5
Under the Fund Protocol an additional 135 million units of
account or approximately $194.4 million would be available to oil
spill victims. 136 Additionally, the Fund Protocol provides for ap-
proximately $288 million to be available for any one incident
United States delegation to the Diplomatic Conference which adopted the Pro-
tocols." Id.
129. Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, May 25, 1984, reprinted in Reference File 1, Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) 21:1531 (1989) [hereinafter CLC Protocol].
130. Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on the Establishment of
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, May 25, 1984,
reprinted in Reference File 1, Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:1731 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Fund Protocol].
131. See Letter of Submittal, supra note 128, at VII.
132. See Statement by President Bush Upon Signing H.R. 1465, 26 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1265-66 (Aug. 27, 1990) [hereinafter Signing Statement].
133. CLC Protocol, supra note 129, art. 6, para. 1.
134. Id. The unit of account referred to in the CLC Protocol is the special
drawing right (SDR) as defined by the International Monetary Fund. See CLC
Protocol, supra note 129, at art. 6, para. 4. Put another way, a unit of account
"refers to the monetary value used to determine the amount of money for which
a shipper may be liable." Stephen T. Smith, Comment, An Analysis of the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 and the 1984 Protocols on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,
13 Hous.J. INT'L L. 115, 118 n.23 (1991) [hereinafter Smith]. As of January 1,
1991, one unit of account was is calculated to equal $1.44. See id. at 131.
135. CLC Protocol, supra note 129, art. 6, para. 1(b). See also Smith, supra
note 134, at 132. Under the CLC Protocol, a ship's tonnage refers to the gross
tonnage of the vessel calculated in accordance with the tonnage measurement
regulations contained in Annex I of the International Convention on Tonnage
Measurement of Ships, 1969. CLC Protocol, supra note 129, art. 6, para. 5.
136. Fund Protocol, supra note 130, art. 6., para. 3(a). See Smith, supra note
129, at 133.
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when a minimum of three Parties to the 1984 Protocols have com-
bined total imports of oil exceeding 600 million tons in the previ-
ous calendar year. ' 3 7
The CLC also provides the vessel owner with certain de-
fenses to liability. A vessel owner shall not be liable for pollution
damage when such damage is caused by: an act of war, a natural
phenomenon, acts or omissions of third parties, or negligent or
wrongful acts committed by governmental entities in the mainte-
nance of lights or other navigational aids.' 38 Additionally, a ves-
sel owner may be wholly or partially exonerated from liability to a
claimant to the extent the pollution damage resulted from the ac-
tions of that claimant.' 3 9
The CLC Protocol does have, however, an unlimited liability
provision. Under the CLC Protocol, a vessel owner is not entitled
to limit its liability if it can be proved that the pollution damage
resulted from the vessel owner's "personal act or omission, com-
mitted with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and
with knowledge that such damage would probably result."'' 40 Ad-
ditionally, the CLC Protocol excludes certain parties from liabil-
ity, such as servants or agents of the owner, members of the crew,
and charterers.' 4 ' However, these parties can be liable under the
137. CLC Protocol, supra note 129, art. 6, para. 3(c). See Smith, supra note
134, at 133.
138. CLC, supra note 118, art. III, para. 2(a)(b)(c). Article III, paragraph 2
states in pertinent part:
No liability for pollution damage shall attach to the owner if he proves
that the damage:
(a) resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrec-
tion or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and ir-
resistible character, or
(b) was wholly caused by an act or omission done with intent
to cause damage by a third party, or
(c) was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act
of any Government or other authority responsible for the mainte-
nance of lights or other navigational aids in the exercise of that
function.
Id.
139. Id. art. III, para. 3.
140. CLC Protocol, supra note 129 art. 6, para. 2.
141. CLC Protocol, supra note 129, art. 4, para. 2. The CLC Protocol spe-
cifically provides that no claim for compensation for pollution damages may be
made against:
(a) the servants or agents of the owner or the members of the crew;
(b) the pilot or any other person who, without being a member of the
crew, performs services for the ship;
(c) any charterer .. . including a bareboat charterer . ..manager or
operator of the ship;
(d) any person performing salvage operations with the consent of the
owner or on the instructions of a ... public authority;
22
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol3/iss2/2
OIL POLLUTION ACT
CLC Protocol if the pollution damage resulted from their "per-
sonal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such
damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage
would probably result."' 142 The CLC Protocol defines pollution
damage as "loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamina-
tion resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the
ship."143 The definition of damage provides that "compensation
for impairment of the environment other than loss of profit[s]
from such impairment shall be limited to costs of reasonable
measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be under-
taken."' 44 Finally, the CLC Protocol definition of pollution dam-
age includes the "costs of preventive measures and further loss or
damage caused by [such] preventive measures."' 145
Despite the United States' active involvement in the develop-
ment of the 1984 Protocols, the House and Senate considered
and rejected these protocols as possible solutions to the global
challenge of oil spill cleanup and prevention. Instead, Congress
widened the scope of liability and compensation for oil pollution
damages available under existing international and federal law by
enacting the OPA.
B. Approaches Suggested by Congress
Prior to the OPA's passage, the House and the Senate con-
sidered several alternative approaches and solutions to oil spill
liability and compensation. In 1989, the House sought to estab-
lish a comprehensive system of liability and compensation for
damages caused by oil pollution. 146 The legislators recognized
that the United States, as the world's largest consumer of oil and
petroleum products, transported primarily by oil tankers, was sus-
ceptible to the adverse impacts of large oil spills on its environ-
ment. 147 After the Exxon Valdez incident, Congress concluded
(e) any persons taking preventative measures;
(f) all servants or agents of persons mentioned in subparagraphs (c),
(d) and (e);
Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. art 2, para. 6(a).
144. Id.
145. Id. art. 2, para. 6(b).
146. H.R. REP. No. 242, supra note 28, at 31. The House acknowledged that
"while existing laws permit the U.S. government to be compensated for certain
cleanup and removal costs, there is no comprehensive legislation in place that
promptly and adequately compensates those who suffer other types of economic
loss as a result of an oil pollution incident." Id.
147. Id. The House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries noted
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that the existing "patchwork of Federal, state, and local laws and
regulations" was "clearly inadequate to address the problems as-
sociated with avoiding or cleaning up oil spills."'148
A proposed House Bill sought to "impose joint, several, and
strict liability on those producing, handling, or transporting oil to
encourage a high standard of care and make certain that those
responsible for [oil] pollution would be held primarily responsi-
ble for the cost."' 49 The bill sought to guarantee quick and fair
compensation for losses whether or not a spiller admitted liability
for the discharge of oil.150 Also, the cost to the taxpayers was to
be reduced by the creation of an Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund,
funded by the oil industry, to be available for reimbursing indi-
viduals and the government for cleanup activities.' 5 ' Impor-
tantly, the legislation sought to "establish a clear and predictable
legal and regulatory framework within which actual or potential
claimants, spillers, and insurers [would] be able to make decisions
relevant to oil pollution matters."'' 52 The legislation also sought
to encourage efforts to improve international standards of oil pol-
lution liability and compensation.153
Although similar to the OPA as now enacted, the House Bill
contained certain provisions not included in the OPA. For exam-
ple, regarding the elements of liability, the House Bill provided
that oil cargo owners would be subject to secondary liability for
oil spills,' 54 meaning that the oil cargo owner would share with
the shipper the liability for removal costs and damages for oil
spills.' 55 The proposed liability limits for tank vessels were the
same as provided under the current OPA. However, in the case
of oil spills from a vessel, the vessel owner or operator would be
that over one-half of the nation's crude oil supply was imported by tankers and
that almost one-quarter of its domestic oil was transported by tankers from
Alaska. Id. Also, in 1989, "[a]pproximately 8,800 oil pollution incidents oc-
cur[red] in the U.S. Waters every year . . . [and] [slince 1972 .... the Coast
Guard [had] .. .responded to approximately 158,000 spills totalling more than
177,000,000 gallons of oil." Id. at 34. The House Committee discussed the
Exxon Valdez oil spill and identified some of the adverse effects it had on the
environment, such as loss of wildlife which included "thousands of seabirds,
hundreds of sea otters, nearly a hundred bald eagles, as well as other species of
waterfowl and marine mammals .... Id. at 31.
148. Id. at 32.
149. Id. at 34.
150. H.R. REP. No. 242, supra note 28, at 34.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 653, supra note 38, at 102.
155. H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 1002 (1989).
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liable for the first 50 percent of the liability limits, while the cargo
owner would be liable for the second 50 percent. 156 If an owner
or operator was subject to unlimited liability, the cargo owner's
liability would still be capped at no more than 50 percent of the
applicable liability limits normally in place.' 57
Additionally, the House Bill proposed implementation of the
CLC Protocol and the Fund Protocol.' 58 The Senate had no simi-
lar provisions in their proposed legislation at that time.' 59 The
House Bill sought to incorporate many of the existing provisions
of the OPA and also to implement 1984 Protocols. This was to be
accomplished by requiring the OPA Fund to indemnify and de-
fend any responsible party in any action brought under any local,
state or federal law for any incident not covered by the CLC Pro-
tocol.' 60 After the Fund had made payment to the claimants, it
would then collect any reimbursable costs from the vessel owner
or operator and/or from the International Fund as provided
under the 1984 Protocols. 16 1 None of these provisions were in-
cluded in the existing OPA.
Title III of the House Bill contained provisions for imple-
menting the 1984 Protocols. In its analysis of Title III of the
House Bill, the House Subcommittee on Human Rights and In-
ternational Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
(House Subcommittee) recognized that the major point of con-
troversy surrounding implementation of the 1984 Protocols was
whether the 1984 Protocols would require the limited preemption
of state and federal oil spill laws.' 62 The Bush Administration ex-
pressed its support for the implementation of the 1984 Proto-
cols.' 63 The Administration supported limited preemption of
156. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 653, supra note 38, at 106.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 125.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 653, supra note 38, at 125-26. This provision has
been viewed by some commentators as ingeniously providing for both ratifica-
tion of the 1984 Protocols and permitting the higher federal and state liability
limits. See Rodriguez &Jaffe, supra note 42, at 24 n.156.
162. Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act: Hearing and Markup Before the
Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess 1 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings].
163. Id. at 11 (statement of Hon. Jeffrey Shane, Asst. Sec'y for Policy and
Int'l Affairs, Dept. of Transportation). Testifying before the House Committee,
Jeffrey N. Shane, the Assistant Secretary for Policy and International Affairs, De-
partment of Transportation, urged that "the 1984 Protocols have a number of
practical advantages for the United States .. " Id. at 7. According to Shane,
these included, "liability sharing between ship owners and oil interests ... com-
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state laws to the extent necessary to implement the 1984 Proto-
cols.' 64 In his testimony before the House of Representatives,
Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Shane, a spokesman for the Depart-
ment of Transportation, urged the view that the international
scheme put forth in the protocols made the prospects for recov-
ery from liable foreign companies much more likely. 165 Even
though some state schemes imposed higher liability limits than
those contained in the Protocols, Assistant Secretary Shane
pointed out that the difficulty many states could have in recover-
ing from foreign entities indicated the need for a more effective
international scheme, as detailed in the 1984 Protocols.' 66 The
seriousness of this problem was highlighted by the fact that most
of the oil imported to the United States is delivered in foreign-
owned tankers.' 6 7 The benefits to implementation of the 1984
Protocols presented to the House Subcommittee included: en-
forceability of United States judgments against polluters in for-
eign jurisdictions; 16  the establishment of a "uniform,
predictable, and insurable worldwide liability and compensation
regime;"' 6 9 and a means by which a major portion of domestic oil
spill costs and damages would be covered by an international
compensation framework. '
70
Some of the adverse results predicted if the 1984 Protocols
were not implemented included the use of limited-asset shipown-
ers in the shipping industry17 and diminished availability of ship-
pulsory insurance and enforceability of U.S. judgments in foreign courts ...
[and] an International [oil spill cleanup] FUND [of] up to $260 million." Id. at
7-8. As Shane described, the U.S. delegation that attended the Diplomatic Con-
ference for the 1984 Protocols was able to negotiate an increase in maximum
ship-owner liability from $18 million to $78 million. Id. at 7.
164. Id. at 8.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 8. Assistant Secretary Shane indicated in his testimony that "un-
limited liability under some state's laws is largely illusory ... in that actual recov-
eries of major amounts are extremely problematical." Id.
167. Hearings, supra note 162, at 92 (statement of the International Associa-
tion of Independent Tanker Owners). In fact, in a report submitted by the U.S.
Coast Guard, it was reported that imported oil was arriving at U.S. ports in
"ever-increasing volumes - 8.6 million barrels per day of crude oil in July
1989" which was "almost all carried by foreign-flag tankers." Id. at 29.
168. Id. at 24 (Analysis of Alternative Approaches to Tanker Oil Spill Liability and
Compensation, prepared by Temple Barker & Sloane, Inc. for the U.S. Coast
Guard).
169. Hearings, supra note 162, at 24.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 33 (Analysis of Alternative Approaches to Tanker Oil Spill Liability and
Compensation, prepared by Temple Barker & Sloane, Inc. for the U.S. Coast
Guard). The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (IN-
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owner insurance for tankers transporting oil to the United
States.' 72 Based upon the testimony and evidence presented, the
House Subcommittee decided to report favorably on Title III of
the House Bill with the recommendation that the bill be reported
to the House without further amendments. 73
The Senate also examined alternative approaches to oil spill
liability and compensation. Specifically, the Senate in 1986 con-
sidered incorporating the 1984 Protocols into proposed oil spill
legislation. At that time, the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions believed that the ratification of the 1984 Protocols was in
the best interest of the United States because it created a frame-
work for timely settlement of claims for oil pollution damages and
consistent enforcement for marine pollution resulting from oil
spills.' 74 However, the Committee also recognized that the 1984
Protocols would provide only a small portion of the comprehen-
sive response to oil pollution damages the Committee anticipated
would be included in the pending federal oil pollution legislation
and under existing state statutes. 175
While the Senate Committee understood that some state lia-
bility laws would be preempted by the Protocols, they also real-
ized that a certain amount of preemption would be necessary for
the 1984 Protocols to produce their intended results. 176 The ap-
TERTANKO) submitted a statement warning that if a law is enacted imposing
strict unlimited liability on the shipowner it would "either stop the flow of oil or
will force. . . the larger and more responsible companies [from calling on U.S.
ports] . . .in favor of smaller companies with few or single ships and otherwise
negligible assets." Id. at 97.
172. Id. at 32. INTERTANKO, in its statement submitted to the House
Subcommittee, indicated that "[m]utual insurance arrangements covering ship-
owner liability represented by Protection and Indemnity Insurance, are largely
dependent upon the prospect of consistent international regimes providing for
both liability and limitation." Id. at 93. The statement then concludes that any
increase in liability limits under a federal statutory regime would reduce avail-
able insurance coverage and/or increase premiums. Id. at 98.
173. Id. at 69-70.
174. S. EXEC. REP. No. 28, supra note 4, at 3. The Senate Committee identi-
fied certain benefits provided by the 1984 Protocols which included "establish-
ing internationally recognized and enforceable jurisdiction over a shipowner, its
guarantor, and the International Fund." Id. at 5.
175. Id. The Committee concluded that "the ratification [of the Protocols,
subject to a reservation and certain understandings] .... is the best way to
synchronize the Protocols with the United States comprehensive oil pollution
legislation being considered by Congress so as to preserve existing state liability
regimes, and to protect the legitimate interests of the coastal States." Id.
176. Id. at 4. Art. 4, para. 2 of the CLC Protocol, provides that "[n]o claim
for compensation for pollution damage may be made against the [ship]owner
[except] .. .in accordance with [the Protocols]." The Senate Committee recog-
nized that "the 1984 Protocol effectively pre-empts action for 'pollution dam-
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proach recommended by the Senate Committee proposed a pos-
sible solution to the preemption issue. The Senate suggested that
the 1984 Protocols be ratified subject to a "reservation" allowing
claimants to bring actions in state courts after all remedies had
been exhausted under the international and federal liability and
compensation regimes.' 77 In particular, the claimant was first to
pursue and exhaust all remedies under the 1984 Protocols, and
then seek to recover under the proposed federal oil spill fund, if
available, before seeking a remedy in the state courts under state
statutory or common-law theories.' 78
Nevertheless, critics believed this approach would effectively
age' against shipowners brought under any other law." S. EXEC. REP. No. 28,
supra note 4, at 4. "Some believe[d] that this would be inappropriate... [where]
state laws [could] have provided compensation for oil pollution damages, except
that they had been pre-empted by the Protocols." Id. However, the Senate
Committee concluded that "it was impossible to reap the benefits offered by the
Protocols without some pre-emption of state liability laws." Id.
177. Id. at 5. In order to afford claimants the opportunity to pursue un-
compensated claims in federal and state courts, the Senate Committee sug-
gested that the 1984 Protocols be ratified subject to a reservation. A reservation
is defined as "a unilateral statement made by a state when signing, ratifying,
accepting, approving, or acceding to an international agreement, whereby it
purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of that agree-
ment in their application to that state." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 313 cmt. a (1987) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT]. For multilateral agreements, "a state entering a reservation not accepta-
ble to all other parties may nonetheless become a party to the agreement, and
the agreement would be in force even between the objecting and reserving
state-except as to the provisions to which the reservation relates ...." Id. at
cmt. b. The reservation suggested by the Senate Committee provided:
Notwithstanding Article III, paragraph 4 of the Convention on Civil Li-
ability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969, as amended, to the extent that
oil pollution damages in respect of anyone incident may exceed the to-
tal amount recoverable under [the 1984 Protocols] ... and the applica-
ble . . . [f]ederal oil pollution liability and compensation statute,
claimants may seek recovery in [state courts] ... pursuant to applicable
[s]tate statutes and common law, after remedies available under the
[1984 Protocols] and the applicable... [flederal oil pollution liability
and compensation statute have been exhausted, except that . . .no
claimant shall be entitled to assert [in any action under a state statute or
common law] any substantive or procedural right based on any provi-
sion of the [1984 Protocols].
Id. at 20-21.
178. Id. at 4-5. The Senate Committee indicated that it did "not intend to
provide claimants with a second avenue of recovery for damages which have
already been ruled upon by a competent court, or settled upon, under the pro-
cedures of the Protocols or [f]ederal law, or both." Id. at 4. Instead, the Senate
Committee intended that the "claimant would first proceed according to the
Protocols, and then, if uncompensated damages still remained, would proceed
to seek recovery from the [federal] domestic [oil spill] fund .... Id. Accord-
ingly, the claimant would have to exhaust all remedies available under the Proto-
cols and federal law before seeking recovery for uncompensated damages under
state or common law. Id. at 5.
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preempt the further protection that could be afforded by state oil
pollution statutes. 79 However, at that time, there had never been
an oil spill that had caused damages in excess of the amounts pro-
vided under the 1984 Protocols, leading the Senate Committee to
believe that most claimants would not need to pursue claims in
the state courts.' 0 Based upon this assumption, the Senate Com-
mittee thought that the international community need not react
negatively to the proposed "reservation" since it would not dis-
rupt the operation of the 1984 Protocols.' 8 '
Along with the state preemption issues, the Senate Commit-
tee also grappled with the problems associated with the vague
definition of "pollution damages" found under the 1984 Proto-
cols. The Senate Committee proposed to remedy this problem by
attaching certain clarifications or understandings to the United
States' instrument of ratification. 8 2 These understandings would
have identified the specific types of damages covered under the
Protocol definitions, such as loss of profits due to oil pollution
damage 83 and loss of subsistence resources. 8 4 The understand-
ings would also have identified what damages were not covered
179. S. EXEc. REP. No. 28, supra note 4, at 4-5. Senator Mitchell expressed
his objection to the 1984 Protocols as follows:
The protocols, as currently drafted, preempt Federal and State law.
This is unacceptable to me, as I indicated in testimony before the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee earlier this year. I will continue to
oppose the protocols unless they are accompanied by a reservation that
provides the protocols are not preemptive.
132 CONG. REC. S14143 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
Further, Senator Mitchell has indicated that "[r]atification of the Protocols
... would prohibit federal or state law from imposing liability on persons other
than in accordance with the Protocols." George J. Mitchell, Preservation of State
and Federal Authority Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 21 ENVTL. L. 237, 242
(1991).
180. S. Exec. Rep. No. 28, supra note 4, at 5 (the Senate Committee identi-
fied the Amoco Cadiz oil spill with estimated damages of $230,000,000).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 5-6. An understanding is a unilateral declaration that does not
purport to "exclude, limit, or modify the state's legal obligation" under the in-
ternational agreement. RESTATEMENT, supra note 177, at cmt. g. An understand-
ing will not be considered a reservation if it "reflects the accepted view of the
agreement." Id. However, another party to the international agreement may
challenge the understanding and treat it as a reservation which it does not wish
to accept. Id.
183. Compare S. EXEC. REP. No. 28, supra note 4, at 6 with Oil Pollution Act
§ 1002(b)(2)(E), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (enacted OPA provided for an ex-
panded version of this loss of profits damage category).
184. Compare S. EXEC. REP. No. 28, supra note 4, at 6 with Oil Pollution Act
§ 1002(b)(2)(C), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(2)(C) (the OPA provided an expanded
version of this loss of subsistence resources damage category).
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under the Protocol definition. 85 After addressing the concerns
identified in the reservation and understandings, the Senate
Committee recommended that the Senate not ratify the 1984 Pro-
tocols until Congress enacted the pending federal oil pollution
statute. 186
For the most part, the approaches taken by the House and
Senate could not be adopted today without undoing the statutory
system in place under the OPA. However, the approaches consid-
ered as the OPA was formed illustrate how Congress sought to
develop a cooperative system of addressing oil spill liability and
cleanup. The advantages to an international liability compensa-
tion system were outweighed by competing federal and state in-
terests and objectives in environmental protection. The result
was the present OPA.
The comprehensive nature of the OPA becomes apparent
when compared to the 1984 Protocols. For example, the defini-
tion of "pollution damage" under the 1984 Protocols is ambigu-
ous and required clarification as previously recognized by the
Senate Committee. 8 7 In contrast, the OPA provides six specific
categories of damages recoverable by various claimants including
the United States, states, Indian tribes and other claimants for
damages incurred as a result of an oil spill. 188 Further, the OPA
has a broad definition of responsible party.' 89 Certain parties
shielded from liability under the 1984 Protocols are clearly de-
fined as responsible parties under the OPA.190 Finally, the provi-
sions of the OPA provide for the imposition of unlimited liability
on the part of the responsible party if the incident in question was
caused either by gross negligence or willful misconduct or by the
violation of applicable federal, safety, construction or operating
regulation by the responsible party.'91 By contrast, the CLC Pro-
tocol provides for unlimited liability only on the part of the vessel
185. S. EXEc. REP. No. 28, supra note 4, at 6.
186. Id. at 7.
187. See infra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
188. See Oil Pollution Act § 1002(b)(2)(A)(B)(C)(D)(E)(F), 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 2702(b)(2)(A)(B)(C)(D)(E)(F). See also supra notes 48-58 and accompanying
text.
189. Oil Pollution Act § 1001(32), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2701(32). For the full text
of section 1001(32), see supra note 32.
190. Compare CLC Protocol, supra note 129, art. 4, para. 2 with Oil Pollution
Act § 1001(32), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2701(32). See infra notes 32 and 141 and accom-
panying text.
191. Oil Pollution Act § 1004(c), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704(c). See infra notes 69-
70 and accompanying text.
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owner, where pollution damage results from the acts or omissions
of the owner committed with the intent to cause such damage
recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably
result. 192 These inconsistencies will probably prevent the ratifica-
tion of the 1984 Protocols in the future. Nevertheless, the prob-
lem of liability and compensation for oil spill disasters is still one
of worldwide importance and concern.
V. CONCERNS AND REACTIONS TO THE OIL POLLUTION
ACT OF 1990
A. Reaction by Industry
The enactment of the unique oil spill liability and compensa-
tion regime under the OPA has had a profound impact on the
international and domestic community. The OPA does not fur-
ther uniformity of international trade, but may actually hinder the
free flow of imported oil into the United States.' 93 Adding to this
impact is the existence of state oil spill liability and compensation
statutes. The practical issue that arises is this: how can these in-
consistent international, federal and state laws be reconciled? To
do nothing could lead to economic disaster. After the enactment
of the OPA, the shipping industry threatened to boycott United
States ports because of the unlimited liability the industry may
face under the existing patchwork of the federal and state laws. 194
The threat of unlimited liability under the OPA has also
prompted some members of the insurance industry to refuse to
issue certificates of financial responsibility required under the
Act. 19 5
When President Bush signed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 he
recognized the global challenge of addressing oil pollution, 96
and therefore urged the Senate to give immediate consideration
192. CLC Protocol, supra note 129, art. 6, para. 2.
193. See infra notes 211-20 and accompanying text.
194. Intertanko to Attend US Oil Pollution Act Hearing, ENERGY NEWS FIN. REP.,
Oct. 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File [hereinafter In-
tertanko to Attend].
195. Stacy Shapiro, P&I Clubs Deny Unlimited Cover for Oil Spills, Bus. INS.,
Sept. 30, 1991 at 22. [hereinafter Shapiro]. The "protection and indemnity
clubs" (P & I clubs) "have no intention of becoming the 'guarantors' for oil
companies under unlimited liability laws . . . 'they are not willing to subject
themselves and their members to the risks associated with giving anticipatory
guarantees, either under the Oil Pollution Act or individual states' acts.' " Id.
196. Signing Statement, supra note 132, at 1266. "[T]he solutions we devise
must be broad enough to address the needs of all nations." Id.
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to ratifying the international protocols. 97 President Bush also
expressed concern that the OPA in its present form might cause
larger oil shipping companies, in an effort to avoid liability, to be
"replaced by smaller companies with limited assets and reduced
ability to pay for the cleanup of oil spills."'198 The President also
recognized that vessel owners would be faced with substantially
increased financial responsibility.' 99 Several industrial groups
have responded with warnings about the potential adverse affect
the OPA will have on the shipping and insurance industry.
The increased liability under the OPA for vessel owners has
the shipping industry concerned. 200 The OPA allows states to en-
act their own oil spill liability and cleanup statutes.20' Additional
oil spill liability and penalties imposed by the states are not sub-
ject to limitation by the OPA or the Limitation of Liability Act of
1851.202 This leads to more uncertainty for vessel owners, along
with an even greater exposure to liability beyond that specifically
set forth in the OPA.20 3
The potential threat of almost unlimited liability under the
OPA and the various state statutes has caused many oil shipping
concerns to cut back on oil deliveries to United States' ports.2°4
Some commentators predicted that responsible oil transporters
would leave the industry instead of facing the threat of unlimited
liability.20 5 Some shipping companies even threatened to boycott
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. In addition to increased financial responsibilities under the OPA,
the oil industry has had to begin preparing contingency plans and start replacing
oil transport fleets with safer oil tankers. "A balance has been sought to give the
industry the flexibility to meet the requirements of the Act without incurring
excessive costs." Id.
200. Robin Price, U.S. Oil Spill Law to Cause Growing Tanker Problem, 89 OIL &
GASJ. 21 (Sept. 30, 1991) [hereinafter Price].
201. Oil Pollution Act § 1018, 33 U.S.C.A. § 2718.
202. Id.
203. Price, supra note 207, at 21.
204. Id. " 'Due to concern about the environmental risks associated with
deliveries to U.S. waters, shipping into the U.S .... by Chevron International
[sic] . . . .will be reduced significantly.'" Id. In addition to Chevron, Royal
Dutch/Shell Group has also indicated plans to cut the size of its fleet considera-
bly, and to phase out its third-party transportation business. Id.
205. Price, supra note 207, at 22. As pointed out by Price:
[O]nly six of 24 U.S. coastal states place a limit on damage liability, and
vague, general terms in some of those states' spill laws could add up to
unlimited liability. As a result, some say responsible transporters will be
scared out of the industry, with the vacuum filled by less responsible
transporters, thus increasing the risk of spills.
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the United States prior to the passage of the OPA.20 6 The
threatened pull out from the United States market by the ship-
ping industry was believed, by some, to be unfounded. 20 7 Less
than two years after the enactment of the OPA, only a few compa-
nies have actually pulled out of the United States market.20
However, more are likely to follow in the wake of the new regula-
tions being promulgated by the Coast Guard to enforce the finan-
cial responsibility and emergency planning and response
requirements under the OPA. 20 9
Not all reaction in the industry has been negative. In 1990,
the Marine Spill Response Corp. (MRSC) was formed by the oil
industry.210 The not-for-profit corporation's expenses are being
paid by petroleum producers and transporters. 2 1' The corpora-
tion recently placed orders for sixteen 210 foot offshore response
vessels. 2 12 The vessels are to come complete with oil skimmers
and containment boom systems.2 13 It is hoped that the MRSC
will fill many of the OPA's requirements in developing new re-
sponse plans to quickly clean up oil spills and protect the environ-
ment.214 A response system is supposed to be in place by
February, 1993.215 Costs for this response program are expected
to reach $900 million over the first five years. 2 16
Shipping concerns, like Exxon Shipping, have taken a posi-
tive approach to the OPA by focusing more on safety in an effort
206. Price, supra note 207, at 23.
207. Nations Seen Acting Unilaterally on Oil Pollution Without Worldwide Scheme,
14 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 274, 275 (May 22, 1990)(statement of Edmund Welch,
Chief Counsel of House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries) [herein-
after Nations Seen Acting Unilaterally].
208. Janet Porter, Spill Plan Worries Small Tanker Owners, J. CoM., Feb. 14,
1992, at 5B [hereinafter Spill Plan]. "Despite widespread threats by tanker op-
erators to boycott the United States after the enactment of the [OPA], only a
handful of companies such as Anglo-Dutch oil company Royal Dutch/Shell and
Danish shipping company Maersk actually withdrew." Id.
209. Id. at 5B. "[O]nce the new regulations concerning financial responsi-
bility and emergency response arrangements come into effect, many shipping
companies may have to stop calling at U.S. ports in order to avoid breaking the
law." Id.
210. Oil Industry Announces Formation of Spill Cleanup Response Organization, 21
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 901 (Sept. 14, 1990).
211. Oil Spills, 22 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 1274 (Sept. 6, 1991) [hereinafter
Oil Spills].
212. Id.
213. Matthew L. Wald, Oil-Spill Organization Gearing Up, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
1991, at D7.
214. Oil Spills, supra note 201, at 1274.
215. Wald, supra note 203, at D7.
216. Id.
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to reduce their exposure to -oil spill liability. 217 Exxon Shipping
has begun to compile a database of all state and federal laws and
regulations in order to assure full compliance under the law.2 18
Also, Conoco, Inc. has already started conversion of its tanker
fleet to double hulled vessels, and has supported the required use
of double hulls on all tankers in U.S. waters by the year 2015.219
Nevertheless, some non-U.S. companies and independent tanker
operators, with the most to lose, may very well avoid U.S.
ports.220 It still remains to be seen what the full impact of the
OPA will be on the shipping industry.
One of the major concerns of vessel owners is the inaccessi-
bility of insurance. The protection and indemnity clubs (P & I
clubs) that write liability coverage for more than 95% of the
world's shipping fleet have said that they will not issue the certifi-
cates of financial responsibility required under the OPA. 22 1 Re-
cently, the Coast Guard published a notice of proposed
rulemaking for regulations that would implement the financial re-
sponsibility provisions of the OPA.222 In the proposed rulemak-
ing, the Coast Guard acknowledges that certain vessel operators
might encounter difficulty in securing the statutorily required cer-
tificates of financial responsibility once this rule goes into ef-
fect.2 2 3 The Coast Guard has recognized that the P & I clubs have
refused to issue the insurance guaranties required under the
OPA.224 In an attempt to remedy this problem, the Coast Guard
sought to solicit specific information about other possible ap-
proaches to compliance with the financial responsibility require-
ments of the OPA. 225  Public comment on the proposed
rulemaking was initially to end on November 25, 1991; however,
upon request, the comment deadline was extended by the Coast
Guard to January 24, 1992.226
A hearing was held on November 6, 1991 before the House
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation of the Committee
217. Price, supra note 207, at 24.
218. Id.
219. Conoco Has Its First Double Hulled Tanker, 90 OIL & GAS J. 30 (Jan. 27,
1992).
220. Price, supra note 207, at 24.
221. Shapiro, supra note 195, at 22.
222. 56 Fed. Reg. 49,006 (1991) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. Parts 130, 131,
132 and 137) (proposed Sept. 26, 1991).
223. Id. at 49,008.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. 56 Fed. Reg. 61,216 (1991).
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on Merchant Marine and Fisheries concerning the proposed rules
for certificates of financial responsibility required by the OPA.2 2 7
During the hearing, the Subcommittee heard testimony on how
the proposed financial responsibility regulations were to be im-
plemented and the impact those regulations would have on insur-
ers, vessel owners and operators. 228 Pursuant to the statute, a
claimant under the OPA has the right to pursue a direct action
lawsuit for removal costs and damages against the guarantor
which issues the certificate of financial responsibility. 229 The P & I
clubs expressed their continued unwillingness to issue certificates
of financial responsibility under the OPA and thereby lay them-
selves open to a multitude of unknown potential claimants. 230
Also, shipping industry representatives warned the Subcommittee
of the adverse effects the financial responsibility requirement has
had on their industry, resulting in lower quality oil transportation
and higher risks of oil pollution.23'
B. International Reactions
The enactment of the OPA and the refusal by the United
States to implement the 1984 Protocols has undermined the ef-
227. Certificates of Financial Responsibility Under the Oil Pollution Act: Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 102d Cong. 1st Sess. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Subcom-
mittee Hearings].
228. Id. In his opening statement Rep. Billy Tauzin, Chairman of the Sub-
committee on Coast Guard and Navigation indicated that the Subcommittee
wanted to hear "comments and suggestions . . . [on] how the Coast Guard can
structure these [financial responsibility] rules to accomplish the goals of the Oil
Pollution Act." Id. at 2.
229. Oil Pollution Act § 1016(f), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2716(0.
230. Id. at 30 (testimony of Terence Coghlin, Chairman of the Managers of
the United Kingdom P & I Club, Chairman Designate of the International Group
of P & I Clubs). Testifying before the House Subcommittee, Mr. Coghlin indi-
cated that "the overall effect of [the OPAl is to undermine the very basis of the
Clubs' insurance cover . . . by expos[ing] itself as a guarantor, without policy
defenses and possibly without financial limit, to a multitude of unknown poten-
tial claimants . . . for damages of unprecedented size and scope." Id.
231. Id. at 49 (testimony of Andreas K.L. Ugland, Chairman, Ugland Group
of Grimstad Norway, Member, INTERTANKO). In his testimony before the
Subcommittee, Mr. Ugland explained that none of the 300 tanker owner mem-
bers of Intertanko had the assets sufficient to satisfy the self-insurance provi-
sions of the Coast Guard's proposed rule and the traditional insurance market
could not provide necessary insurance cover. Id. Stathes J. Kulukundis, Direc-
tor of the Greek Shipping Cooperation Committee, stated before the Subcom-
mittee that shipowners "are trading on a seriously underinsured basis . . ." and
playing "a form of maritime Russian roulette risking complete [financial] ruin
... exposing the Federal Oil Liability Trust Fund to substantial unrecoverable
payments in the event ... the limit of the owner's liability insurance is exceeded
and its reachable assets exhausted." Id. at 50-51.
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fectiveness of an international liability and compensation sys-
tem.232 As a result, higher liability limits will not be available
under the 1984 Protocols, 23 3 making other nations reluctant to
ratify the 1984 Protocols in light of their increased financial bur-
den.23 4 The result may create a two-tiered international market.
In such an international market, one set of standards would apply
to the United States and another set of standards would apply to
the rest of the world. 23 5 Nonetheless, the foreign vessel owner,
dependent upon its trade with the United States, may continue to
service this market despite concerns surrounding higher liability
exposure. 2 36 Many of the increased costs of doing business in the
United States market will ultimately be passed onto the consum-
ing public.2 37
However, the impact of the OPA may also be a positive impe-
tus for change in the international community. Some nations, in-
cluding Canada and Germany, are already considering enacting
legislation similar to the OPA. 238 Nations may begin to turn away
from the existing international liability and compensation system
and adopt their own legislation in response to the OPA. 2 39 Al-
ready, the OPA requirement for double hulled tankers has re-
ceived international attention. The IMO's Marine Environment
Protection Committee (MEPC) agreed to consider the incorpora-
232. See Nations Seen Acting Unilaterally, supra note 214, at 274 ("[w]ithout
U.S. participation, the 1984 protocols' entry into force conditions are difficult to
fulfill.").
233. See Oil Pollution Compensation Fund Members Near Accord on System Without
U.S. Role, 14 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 159 (Mar. 27, 1991) ("introduction of [the
OPA] blocked entry into force of the protocol's higher limits worldwide").
234. Nations Seen Acting Unilaterally, supra note 214, at 274.
235. Price, supra note 207, at 24.
236. See Charles Anderson, Oil Pollution Act Fouls the Regulatory Waters, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 20, 1992, at A18 (most foreign-flag tankers "[r]ecognizing the value
of this trade . . . are responding positively to the Oil Pollution Act and are at-
tempting to comply with its provisions.")
237. See, e.g., Price, supra note 207, at 26 ("[s]hipowners will pass along the
extra costs to cargo owners, who will in turn pass it on to consumers."). Janet
Porter, Oil Pollution Act Pushes Up Rates to the US, Tanker Owners Say; Other Officials
Cite Ship Quality, J. COM., Nov. 13, 1991, at 5B (INTERTANKO research indi-
cates OPA has cost American oil companies and consumers an extra $420 mil-
lion for transportation).
238. Price, supra note 207, at 24.
239. See Nations Seen Acting Unilaterally, supra note 214, at 274 ("[n]ations
may take unilateral action on oil pollution and tanker issues if current attempt
fails to rescue international liability and compensation arrangements."). Janet
Porter, Industry, Reviews Lobbying Tactics, Fearing European Spill Legislation, J. CoM.,
May 14, 1991 at 8B ("[wihile there are no formal proposals for similar legisla-
tion in the European Community, many think it only a matter of time before
Europe follows suit").
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tion of the double hull requirement for all new tankers into its
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, 1973 and its 1978 Protocol (MARPOL 73/78).240 This has
produced an outcry from the shipping industry for recognition of
alternatives to the double hull design.24' MEPC agreed to accept
alternative designs which would be measured against the double
hull concept in assessing the abilities of such designs to minimize
oil spills. 2 4 2 Based upon its review, the IMO was expected to pro-
pose a regulation allowing shipowners to build new tankers either
under the double hull standard or under the alternatively pro-
posed mid-deck tanker design. 245 However, the proposed regula-
tion is being opposed by some nations until a regulation covering
existing tankers is approved. 244 Although the OPA has elicited a
certain amount of negative criticism and reactions, it has also
sparked healthy debate which is likely to lead to safer design re-
quirements for ships worldwide.
VI. CONCLUSION
In 1991, world oil demand was at the staggeringly high level
of sixty-six million barrels a day.2 45 In 1990, oil imports to the
United States averaged about 7.6 million barrels per day.2 4 6 This
accounted for "more than half of the oil consumed in the United
240. William Hayden, Double-hulled Tankers of Tomorrow, PROC. MARINE
SAFETY COUNCIL, Vol. 48, No. 2, at 11 (March - April, 1991). The International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (MARPOL) was
adopted at the International Conference on Marine Pollution held in London in
1973. See International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973,
Nov. 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319 (1973). Annex I of MARPOL covered regulations
for the prevention of pollution by oil. Id. at 1335. In 1978, Annex I of
MARPOL was revised at the International Conference on Tanker Safety and Pol-
lution Prevention, held in London. See Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, Feb. 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M.
546, 550 (1978). MARPOL and its 1978 Protocol became effective on October
2, 1983. See Jeff B. Curtis, Comment, Vessel-Source Oil Pollution and Marpol 73/78:
An International Success Story?, 15 ENVTL. L. 679 (1985). The new requirement of
double hull design would be introduced through a new regulation 13F to Annex
I of MARPOL and its 1978 Protocol. See Marine Organization to Set Rules on Double
Bottom Hulls for Oil Tankers, 14 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 390, 391 (July 17, 1991)
[hereinafter Marine Organization to Set Rules].
241. Marine Organization to Set Rules, supra note 240 at 390.
242. Id.
243. Alan Abrams, N. European Move Could Sink Plans for Tanker Designs, J.
COM., Feb. 27, 1992, at 8B.
244. Id.
245. James Tanner, Pollution Worries Spark Energy Taxes, and That Has Oil Ex-
porters Concerned, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1991, at B7.
246. Eric Harrison, Persian Gulf Crisis Reopening Debate Over Synthetic Fuel,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1990, at Dl.
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States." 247 The ever-increasing demand for oil must be viewed
together with society's growing concerns about the adverse ef-
fects oil pollution has on our environment.
Vessel owners, oil cargo interests and the consuming public
have already or will be affected by the enactment of the OPA.
Vessel owners involved in an oil spill are held responsible, at the
very least, for damages up to a specified monetary limit, regard-
less of fault.248 In some cases, the vessel owner's liability can be
unlimited. 249 Oil cargo interests now must contribute to the OPA
Fund 250 in the form of five cent per barrel tax imposed on all
domestic and imported oil.251 The failure of the OPA to preempt
state statutes requires the oil and shipping industry to comply
with varying state laws which may subject them to unlimited liabil-
ity252 or more stringent regulatory requirements. 253 The con-
suming public will almost certainly feel the effects of the OPA in
the form of higher prices for petroleum products. 254 The existing
liability and compensation scheme of state and federal laws has
created uncertainty and been described as a "uniquely draconian
patchwork of laws." 255
If the OPA is ever revisited, some of the earlier analysis and
approaches of the House and Senate should be reconsidered. As
recognized previously by the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, oil spill liability and compensation legisla-
tion should establish "a clear and predictable legal and regulatory
framework within which actual or potential claimants, spillers,
and insurers will be able to make decisions relevant to oil pollu-
tion matters. ' 256 If all the interested parties work together, a pre-
dictable legal and regulatory framework can be developed.
However, each must be willing to accept responsibility for the
247. Id.
248. Oil Pollution Act § 1004(a), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704(a).
249. Id. § 1004(c), U.S.C.A. § 2704(c).
250. 26 U.S.C.A. § 9509 (West Supp. 1991).
251. 25 U.S.C.A. § 4611(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1991).
252. Price, supra note 207, at 22.
253. See, e.g. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 8670.37.53 (West Supp. 1992) (stat-
ute requires vessels to maintain certificates of financial responsibility of at least
$500 million, which are to increase to $1 billion by the year 2000).
254. See, e.g., Price, supra note 207 at 26 ("shipowners will pass along the
extra insurance costs to cargo owners, who will in turn pass it on to consumers
... , ).
255. Shapiro, supra note 195, at 22 (quoting Richard Yowell, underwriter
for Lloyd's of London syndicate 79).
256. See H.R. REP. No. 242, supra note 28, at 34.
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need and demand for oil and the inherent risks in oil
transportation.
Major legislative revisions are probably not necessary if a co-
operative approach is taken toward the implementation of the
OPA. Cooperation between the shipping industry, the insurance
industry, oil cargo interests and the government will provide for a
workable oil spill liability and compensation regime. If flexibility
is demonstrated by all interests involved, drastic changes to the
OPA will not be needed. For example, the implementation of
regulations regarding the financial responsibility provisions have
prompted a great deal of debate. Even so, Richard Quegan,
chairman of the American Petroleum Institute Marine Transpor-
tation Committee, recognized "that there is flexibility within the
regulatory process to resolve our problems, but it is going to take
a spirit of cooperation and flexibility [from] all concerned. ' 257
This sort of willingness to cooperate in addressing the OPA is
indispensable.
The federal and state governments must also be as flexible in
their approach to the OPA. One of the main concerns of the in-
dustry surrounds the threat of unlimited liability under state law
regimes that were not preempted by the OPA. States must heed
these concerns or face wholesale boycotts of their ports by the
tanker industry or possible preemption by Congress if the OPA is
revisited.
The higher standard of care imposed on those involved in
the transportation, handling and production of oil by the OPA
can be looked upon as a positive development in the protection of
our environment. However, a flexible approach must be taken in
addressing the industry's concerns about the OPA in light of the
economic ramifications of the statute. All interested parties must
continue to work together to establish a clear and predictable
legal framework within which private citizens, federal and state
governments, oil transporters, oil cargo interests and insurers are
able to abide by the risks and responsibilities involved in the pro-
duction, transportation, handling and consumption of oil.
257. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 227 at 52 (testimony of Mr. Richard
Quegan, Chairman, API Marine Transportation Committee).
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